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I. INTRODUCTION
The federal government's role in disaster management has evolved
from simply providing tax relief to that of an active participant in prevention,
response, and recovery.' Experience with massive catastrophes that cause
1. See infra Table 1.
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multiple casualties 2 in the United States is limited; only ten large disasters
are recorded in which there were over 1000 fatalities.3 Prior to the 2006
Hurricane Season, experts agreed that there would be more category four and
five hurricanes. 4 In addition, the risk from large-scale deliberate disasters is
increasing; particularly as acquiring nuclear weapons is considered a potent
political, military, and social tool. 5 Since the 9/11 attacks, the federal gov-
ernment has recognized the urgent need for an improved, integrated National
Plan for Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. The response to the 2005
hurricanes demonstrated the need for even more changes. This article first
examines the changes initiated by 9/11. The article then reveals the man-
dated improvements, such as further integration between federal, state/tribal,
and local government and the private sector capabilities that were made ob-
vious by the lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, focusing par-
ticularly on some of the health care issues that arose. Finally, the article
raises some very significant issues that continue to require multi-disciplinary
and creative solutions and that must be addressed in disaster preparedness.
In February 2003, the White House produced Homeland Security Presi-
dential Directive-5 (HSPD-5) on the Management of Domestic Incidents,6
2. The term "casualty" is often ill-defined. In some texts, the term casualty means
death, whereas in others it implies a patient with a treatable injury or illness. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 231 (8th ed. 2004). In this article, the term "casualty" is used to encompass
both those with potentially treatable conditions and the dead. The absolute number of patients
needed to define an event as producing "mass casualties" is less important than the functional
impact to the existing support system. An incident that overwhelms the resources of a given
system at a specific point in time is considered a mass casualty event. High impact events
may or may not cause large numbers of directly impacted persons, but may nonetheless cause
a large impact on the support system, because of the numbers of persons who fear that they
may have been impacted. Thus, if one considers the "psychological casualties" and the fact
that the effects of major natural catastrophes or of a terrorist event can be far-reaching, then
even events with limited numbers of directly impacted persons can be "mass casualties"
events.
3. See infra Table 2.
4. National Weather Service, NOAA, Climate Prediction Center: Atlantic Hurricane
Outlook - Background Information, http://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/prod-
ucts/outlooks/background information.shtml#NOAADEF (last visited June 21, 2007).
5. George P. Shultz et al., A World Free of Nuclear Weapons, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2007,
at Al 5; see U.N. Security Council Votes to Impose Tougher Iran Sanctions, WALL ST. J., Mar.
25, 2007.
6. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5-Management of Domestic Inci-
dents, 1 PUB. PAPERS 229 (Feb. 28, 2003) [hereinafter HSPD-5].
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and in December 2003, the White House issued Homeland Security Presi-
dential Directive-8 (HSPD-8) on National Preparedness.
7
HSPD-5 called for a transition from a Federal Response Plan (FRP) to a
National Response Plan (NRP)8 coupled with a National Incident Manage-
ment System (NIMS). 9 The hope was that the NIMS would provide a con-
sistent nationwide approach for federal, state, tribal, and local governments
to work together effectively and efficiently to prepare, respond, and recover
from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. The back-
bone of the NIMS is the Incident Command System (ICS), 1° expanded so
that NIMS would provide for interoperability and compatibility among fed-
eral, state, tribal, and local capabilities. The NIMS included a core set of
concepts, principles, terminology, and technologies covering the incident
command system, multi-agency coordination systems, unified command,
training, identification and management of resources, qualifications and cer-
tification, as well as the collection, tracking, and reporting of incident infor-
mation and incident resources.
HSPD-8 had the goal of establishing policies to strengthen the prepar-
edness of the United States to prevent and respond to emergencies under a
national, domestic, all-hazards preparedness goal. The NRP, modeled on the
FRP, 11 incorporated the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Assistance and Emer-
gency Relief Act, 12 and presented an all-hazards approach. The NRP, using
the NIMS, was designed to provide the structure and mechanisms for na-
tional level policy and operational direction for federal support to state and
local incident managers and for exercising direct federal authorities and re-
7. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8-National Preparedness, 2 PuB.
PAPERS 1822 (Dec. 17, 2003) [hereinafter HSPD-8]. For a complete list of Presidential Direc-
tives, see http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/direct.htm.
8. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN (2004), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NRPbaseplan.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN].
9. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (2004),
available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/nims doc full.pdf.
10. The ICS was developed in the early 1970s to deal with differences among agencies
and unspecified incident objectives in certain disasters. Occupational Safety & Health
Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Incident Command System: What is an Incident Command
System? http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/ics/what-is ics.html (last visited June 21, 2007).
ICS is "a standardized on-scene incident management concept designed specifically to allow
responders to adopt an integrated organizational structure equal to the complexity and de-
mands of any single incident or multiple incidents without being hindered by jurisdictional
boundaries." Id.
11. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN: BASIC PLAN (2003), avail-
able at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/frp/frpbasic.pdf.
12. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Assistance and Emergency Relief Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-707, 102 Stat. 4689 ((codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5121 (2000 & Supp.)).
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sponsibilities, as appropriate. 13 The NRP attempted to capture protocols for
operating under different threats or threat levels and it incorporated, as much
as possible, the existing federal emergency and incident management plans,
along with rigorous requirements for continuous improvements from testing,
exercising, and experience. The hope was that the NRP would provide a
consistent approach to reporting incidents, providing assessments, and mak-
ing recommendations to the President, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
and the Homeland Security Council. HSPD-8 also called for a National Pre-
paredness Goal that established measurable priorities, targets, and a common
approach to developing needed capabilities. 14 This National Preparedness
Goal uses a Capabilities-Based Planning approach to determine how pre-
pared we are, how prepared we should be, and how to prioritize our efforts to
close the gaps. It required the development of a target capabilities list that
identified the capabilities of federal, state, local, and tribal entities.
Hurricane Katrina revealed many gaps and issues with the National
Preparedness Goal and its target capabilities list, as well as issues with the
NRP and the NIMS. The lessons learned have led to major revisions in all of
these documents' 5 and to the development of an NRP/NIMS review proc-
ess. 16
13. See infra Figure 1.
14. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet: Strengthening National Preparedness:
Capabilities-Based Planning, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/CBP_041305.pdf (last vis-
ited June 21, 2007); see also HSPD-8, supra note 7.
15. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NOTICE OF CHANGE TO THE NATIONAL
RESPONSE PLAN (2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NRPNotice-of
Change_5-22-06.pdf [hereinafter NOTICE OF CHANGE TO THE NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN];
FEMA, NIMS BASIC: ONGOING MANAGEMENT AND MAINTENANCE, (Mar. 23, 2006),
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/nims/NIMS_basic_ongoing management and maintenance.pdf;
Memorandum from Al Fluman, Acting Dir., NIMS Integration Ctr., FEMA, DHS to the NIMS
Stakeholders (Mar. 26, 2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nims-upgrade-
revision-v2-032707.pdf;U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., National Response Plan and National
Incident Management System Review and Revision Process, Stakeholder Meeting, National
Incident Management System (NIMS) Key Revision Issues - Background (Oct. 25, 2006),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/ assets/nrp-nims-upgrade-bullets-102406.pdf [hereinafter NIMS
Key Revision Issues - Background]; U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., National Response Plan
and National Incident Management System Review and Revision Process, Stakeholders Meet-
ing, NIMS Upgrade Summary (Oct. 25, 2006), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nrp-nims-
upgrade-paper-102406.pdf [hereinafter NIMS Upgrade Summary]; U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SEC., HURRICANE KATRINA IMPACT ON THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GOAL AND TARGET
CAPABILITIES LIST, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/KatrinaslmpactontheGoalandTCL.pdf
(last visited June 21, 2007).
16. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., The NRP/NIMS Review Process Coordination Struc-
ture, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nrp-nims-coord-structure.pdf (last visited June 21,
2007).
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II. HURRICANE KATRINA
Hurricane Katrina collided with South Florida, picked up strength, and
slammed into the Gulf Coast ravaging Mississippi, Louisiana, and Alabama
in late August 2005.17
On August 29, 2005, at approximately 6:10 a.m. CDT (7:10 a.m. EST),
Hurricane Katrina's eye made landfall at Buras, on the Louisiana coast, be-
tween Grand Isle and the mouth of the Mississippi River. An hour and a half
before the storm made landfall, the levees near the CSX railroad and Indus-
trial canal were breached and the flooding of residential areas in greater New
Orleans began. The storm surge overtopped the levees on the east bank of
the river, "crossed" the river, overtopped the levees on the west bank, and
sent additional water into neighborhoods in Plaquemines Parish. The center
of Hurricane Katrina moved ashore into southeast Louisiana just east of
Grand Isle. Catastrophic flooding manifested in New Orleans from massive
overtopping of levees in east Orleans and St. Bernard Parish, overtopping
and breaking of the Industrial Canal levees, and breaks in the 17th Street and
London Avenue Canal flood walls. Though the flooding was first reported
locally at 8:21 a.m. CDT (9:21 a.m. EST) on Monday, the Homeland Secu-
rity Operations Center (HSOC) merely reported a "levee issue" at 9:50 a.m.
CDT (10:50 a.m. EST) on Monday. Sadly, by Monday morning the disaster
zone encompassed an area of 93,000 square miles, and thirteen states were in
17. SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO
HURRICANE KATRINA, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 1-27 (2006), available at
http:/ikatrina.house.gov/full-katrinareport.htm [hereinafter A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE];
FRANCES F. TOWNSEND, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED
1 (2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-leamed.pdf; COMM. ON
HOMELAND SEC. & GOV'T AFFAIRS, HURRICANE KATRINA: A NATION STILL UNPREPARED, S.
REP. No. 109-322 (2006), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/Katrina/FullReport.pdf;
Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness, Response,
and Recovery: Hearing Before the S. Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs Comm., 109th Cong. 2
(2006) (statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06442t.pdf [hereinafter Walker Statement]; U.S. DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS AND SPECIAL
REVIEWS, A PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF FEMA's DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES IN
RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 1 (Mar. 31, 2006), http://www.dhs.gov/
xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG 06-32_MarO6.pdf [hereinafter FEMA PERFORMANCE REVIEW];
U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CATASTROPHIC DISASTERS: ENHANCED LEADERSHIP,
CAPABILITIES, AND ACCOUNTABILITY CONTROLS WILL IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
NATION'S PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY SYSTEM, GAO-06-618 (Sept. 6, 2006),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06618.pdf [hereinafter CATASTROPHIC
DISASTERS]; U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONWIDE PLAN REVIEW PHASE 2 REPORT
(2006), available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Prep _NationwidePlanReview.pdf;
see infra Table 4.
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a "state of emergency." The storm had caused repeated surges of water
many reaching twenty-seven feet above normal in the Biloxi Mississippi
area, and damaged 169 miles of levees in Louisiana. It was not until Tues-
day, August 30, at 6:00 a.m. EST that the HSOC finally provided a con-
firmed report of a breach. Inexplicably, Secretary of Homeland Security
Michael Chertoff held off declaring Hurricane Katrina an "Incident of Na-
tional Significance"' 18 until Tuesday evening, August 30, at 7:30 p.m. EST. 19
The impact from these events were felt not only by the thousands of
people caught in the path of the storms, but also by the entire nation as we
struggled to provide shelter, food, medical resources, and law enforcement to
those in and from the affected communities, and to deal with the economic
consequences of the damaged infrastructure caused by these storms. The
hurricanes, coupled with the subsequent flooding, caused the same sort of
devastation to many local health care facilities, research centers, waste facili-
ties, chemical facilities, and cemeteries, as it did to other types of buildings
in the region, compounding the medical threats to the community. It dam-
aged jails and law offices, compounding the security and law enforcement
issues as well.
Countless foreign nations, from the poorest to the wealthiest, offered
cash and in-kind donations, including foreign military donations to the
United States. In-kind donations included food, clothing, medical supplies,
and equipment. FEMA and other government agencies, however, did not
have plans, policies, or procedures to ensure the proper acceptance and dis-
tribution of either cash or in-kind assistance donated by foreign countries and
militaries. FEMA and other agencies established ad hoc procedures, but no
agency tracked and confirmed that the assistance arrived at their destinations.
18. NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN, supra note 8, at 4. The response to the hurricanes of
2005 was based on the NRP of December 2004. In the NRP of December 2004, an "Incident
of National Significance" was defined as being based on criteria established in paragraph 4 of
HSPD-5, and was considered an actual or potential high-impact event that required a "coordi-
nated and effective response by an appropriate combination of federal, state, local, tribal,
nongovernmental, and/or private-sector entities in order to save lives, minimize damage, and
provided the basis for long-term community recovery and mitigation activities." Id. at 3.
Paragraph 4 of HSPD-5 states:
The Secretary shall coordinate the Federal Government's resources utilized in response to or
recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies if and when any one of
the following four conditions applies: (1) a Federal department or agency acting under its own
authority has requested the assistance of the Secretary; (2) the resources of State and local au-
thorities are overwhelmed and Federal assistance has been requested by the appropriate State
and local authorities; (3) more than one Federal department or agency has become substan-
tially involved in responding to the incident; or (4) the Secretary has been directed to assume
responsibility for managing the domestic incident by the President.
HSPD-5, supra note 6, at 230.
19. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
2007]
7
Marty: Hurricane Katrina: A Deadly Warning Mandating Improvement to the
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
NOVA LA WREVIEW
Lack of procedures, inadequate data about the donations, and poor coordina-
tion resulted in the United States government agreeing to receive food and
medical items that could not be used in the United States and led to storage
costs of about $80,000.20
III. KEY FACTORS THAT LED TO FAILURES
(1) Long-term warnings went unheeded and government officials ne-
glected their duties to prepare for a forewarned catastrophe. 2'
(2) Government officials took insufficient actions or made poor deci-
sions in the days immediately before and after landfall.22
(3) Some important definitions and triggers in the NRP were not clearly
defined.
(4) The Catastrophic Incident Annex could not be activated without the
declaration of an Incident of National Significance or the specific request of
the affected state.
(4) There were inconsistencies between the NRP and NIMS.
(5) There was ignorance concerning the NRP, NIMS, and the lessons
learned from the Hurricane Pam exercise by key persons at all levels of re-
sponse.
(6) Funding was cut to the Hurricane Pam exercise before it was com-
pleted, thus while problems were identified, key planning decisions for man-
aging the problems were not yet made (plans for medical care for victims
were not finalized, communication issues were not addressed, and key trans-
portation decisions were left "to be determined").
(7) The systems which officials relied on to support their response ef-
forts failed.
(8) Government officials at all levels failed to provide effective leader-
ship and were confused regarding their relative responsibilities.23
(9) There were problems with communication and situational aware-
ness.
(10) Our plan failed to recognize that local police, fire, and medical per-
sonnel might be incapacitated.
20. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HURRICANE KATRINA: COMPREHENSIVE
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE APPROPRIATE USE OF AND
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE, GAO-06-460, at 1 (Apr. 6, 2006), avail-
able at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06460.pdf.
21. S. REP. 109-322.
22. Id.
23. See supra note 17; see also Ben Depoorter, Horizontal Political Externalities: The
Supply and Demand of Disaster Management, 56 DuKE L.J. 101 (2006).
[Vol. 31
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(11) There was a need but no plan in effect that utilized a modem,
flexible, transparent logistic system between federal, state, local, and indus-
try agencies.
(12) Confusion arose regarding the roles of the Principle Federal Offi-
cial and the Federal Coordinating Officer.
(13) We were unprepared to manage and accept the unprecedented tide
of foreign assistance on this scale.24
(14) Issues arose between the roles of the Military and the National
Guard, and their deployment was delayed.
(15) There was confusion between the roles of the HSOC, Interagency
Incident Management Group (IIMG), and other operation centers and delays
in activating the IIMG.
IV. ADJUSTMENTS TO NRP, NIMS, AND THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS
GOAL AND ITS TARGET CAPABILITIES
A. Adjustments to National Response Plan
The NRP applies to all incidents requiring a coordinated federal re-
sponse and is an all-hazards plan built on the template of the NIMS, which
provides the structure and mechanism for national-level policy and opera-
tional direction for managing a domestic incident. Its flexibility is intended
to enable effective interaction among various federal, state, local, tribal, pri-
vate-sector, and other nongovernmental entities. The specific changes to the
NRP following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita are:
(1) The NRP is always in effect.25
(2) When incidents impact the entire nation, multiple states, or locali-
ties, multiple Joint Field Offices (JFO) 26 may be established regionally.
(3) The Secretary will consider the four criteria set forth in HSPD-5
when making the determination to declare an Incident of National Signifi-
24. See generally U.S. Dep't of State, Freedom of Information Act - Document Collec-
tion: Hurricane Katrina-Relief Assistance, http://foia.state.gov/SearchColls/CollsSearch.asp
(select "Hurricane Katrina"; click "Search") (last visited June 21, 2007).
25. In the December 2004 NRP, which was not always in effect, the NRP could be par-
tially or fully implemented in the context of a threat, anticipation of a significant event, or in
response to a significant event. Selective implementation through the activation of one or
more of the system's components was supposed to allow for maximum flexibility in meeting
the unique operational and information-sharing requirements of the situation at hand and
enabling effective interaction between various federal and non-federal entities.
26. A JFO is a temporary federal facility established locally to serve as a central point for
federal, state, local, and tribal executives who have responsibility for incident oversight, direc-
tion, and/or assistance to effectively coordinate protection, prevention, preparedness, re-
sponse, and recovery actions.
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cance, but he is no longer bound to them; he is not limited to those thresh-
olds, and he may base his decision on other applicable factors.
(4) The declaration of an Incident of National Significance is no longer
critical to the decision to implement certain elements of the NRP.
(5) Catastrophic Incident Annex: While the basic premise still applies
that incidents are generally handled at the lowest jurisdictional level possible,
the revised NRP says the CI Annex is primarily designed to address no-
notice or short-notice catastrophic incidents where the need for federal assis-
tance is obvious and immediate. This allows the federal government to act in
support of projected needs in anticipation of requests from state and local
authorities.
(6) Department of Defense (DoD) provides Defense Support of Civil
Authorities (DSCA) in response to requests for assistance during domestic
incidents. The supported DoD combatant commander may use a Joint Task
Force (JTF) to command federal Title X military activities in support of the
incident. Command and Control of the JTF is collocated with the Principal
Federal Official (PFO)27 at the JFO to ensure coordination and unity of ef-
forts.
(7) The Secretary of Homeland Security is now permitted to combine
the roles of the PFO and that of the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) 28 in
a single individual for any disaster that is not an incident resulting from ter-
rorism.
(8) To ensure coordination of effort, whenever possible, from opera-
tional entities such as DoD JTF; headquarters will collocate at the Joint Field
Office.
(9) To better coordinate the NIMS with the NRP elements of Emer-
gency Support Functions (ESF), they now organizationally fall within the
Operations, Planning, and Logistics and Finance/Administration sections of
the Joint Field Office, and other sections as required.
(10) The Domestic Readiness Group, which serves as a permanent
standing interagency planning/operations staff housed within the National
Operations Center, was created.
(11) The HSOC was replaced with the National Operations Center.
27. The PFO is the federal official designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security to
act as his or her local representative to oversee, coordinate, and execute the Secretary's inci-
dent management responsibilities under HSPD-5 for Incidents of National Significance.
28. The FCO is someone appointed to manage federal resource support activities related
to Stafford Act disasters and emergencies. The FCO is responsible for coordinating timely
delivery of federal disaster assistance resources and programs to the affected state and local
governments, individual victims, and the private sector.
[Vol. 31
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(12) The Interagency Incident Management Group was replaced with an
incident advisory group and adjudication body for the Secretary of Home-
land Security.
B. Adjustments to National Incident Management System
The NIMS provides a structural framework for incident management at
all jurisdictional levels regardless of the cause, size, or complexity of an
event. The basic components of NIMS are now Preparedness, Communica-
tions and Information Management, Resource Management, and the Com-
mand and Management component-headed by the Incident Commander.
2 9
These four NIMS components work together as a system to provide the na-
tional framework for incident management. Each organization-e.g., fire,
police, emergency medical services, hospitals, etc.-needs some type of an
Incident Management System (IMS) with an Incident Command System
(ICS). The Command and Management oversees four sections-Operations,
Planning, Logistics, and Finance. 30 When more than one entity works to-
gether, a "joint command" is used. The Command is responsible for overall
operations and liaisons with other agencies. The Operations Section houses
the "doers"; the Planning Section looks ahead and addresses the "what if'
scenarios; the Logistics Section gets "stuff' to keep operations going; and the
Finance Section tracks and authorizes expenses and personnel. The ICS pro-
vides a flexible infrastructure that can expand and contract as time evolves,
depending on the size and complexity of the event. All personnel need to
have clearly defined roles and responsibilities, based on previously described
functions rather than on specific individuals.
As of March 26, 2007, the NIMS working group has produced a draft
NIMS Upgrade V2. 31 The working group continues to study, obtain, and
review comments and revise NIMS accordingly to include: improving the
guidance to clarify roles and responsibilities within the NIMS framework;
the incorporation of concept preparedness into NIMS; and making NIMS
easier for stakeholders to use. The revised NIMS will provide clearer identi-
fication of the relationships between the NIMS, HSPD-8, the NRP, and other
federal response efforts.32 In addition, the revised NIMS will emphasize
29. Memorandum from Al Fluman, supra note 15.
30. See Figure 2.
31. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., NRP & NIMS Review-NIMS Working Group.
http://www.dhs.gov/xprepresp/programs/gcl168637749890.shtm (last visited June 21,
2007).
32. Id.
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NIMS training for emergency management, response personnel, disaster
workers, private sector, and nongovernmental agencies.
C. Adjustments to National Preparedness Goal and Its Target Capabilities
The impact of the 2005 hurricanes required changes to our National
Preparedness Goal (NPG).3 3  A new national priority was added:
"Strengthen Emergency operations planning and citizen protection capabili-
ties." This new priority is now a capability-specific priority to the NPG.
Emergency planning is now a "National Security Priority."
The NPG is now more strongly viewed as one with an "All-Hazard" ap-
proach and less of a counter-terrorism approach. The specific capabilities in
environmental health, fatality management, citizen protection (evacuation or
in-place protection), public safety and security response, on-site incident
management and emergency operations center management (such that gov-
ernment officials are better prepared to handle their role in managing a major
event), and urban search and rescue (to emphasize search of evacuated areas
in addition to structural collapse extrication) have been modified or re-
written. There are also plans to rewrite or modify mass care, short-term re-
covery, critical resource logistics and distribution, citizen preparedness and
participation, and water rescue.
V. PUBLIC HEALTH ASPECTS
A. Lessons Learned from Katrina Regarding Public Health in a
Catastrophe
(1) Shelter in place: Hospitals had to support thousands of extra peo-
ple--evacuees, families of staff and patients, policemen, firefighters, Na-
tional Guardsmen, and United States Marshals. Extra beds, toiletries, and
food needed to be found and distributed at the same time that patient care
was being provided.
(2) Loss of access to drugs and vaccines.
(3) Separating acute treatment needs from pre-existing conditions.
(4) Impact on Hospital staff: Many lost their homes, some lost medi-
cal practices by loss of patients.
(5) Need to improvise and disregard certain rules during event.
(6) Reorienting medical specialists toward providing primary care.
33. See generally U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL PREPAREDNEss GOAL
(2005), available at http://www.iaem.com/documents/FinalDraftNPG.pdf.
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(7) Location of generators-loss of power on health care (e.g. dialysis
equipment, ventilators, etc.).
(8) Coordination between FEMA & DHHS.
(9) Evacuating/accepting patients: Transportation issues.
(a) Need for better planning and coordination of transportation of
patients to/from hospitals, because following Katrina the nearest
centers got most patients and were overwhelmed.
(b) Need for better plans for the evacuation of handi-
capped/elderly.
(10) Heat, hygiene, and waste disposal.
(11) Immunizing workers who clean up debris.
(12) Complications caused by mold, allergies, petrochemicals, and in-
fectious agents.
(13) Security forces need to coordinate with health experts as per the
ICS.
(14) Hospitals in New Orleans failed to anticipate communication fail-
ures, and such failures lasted nearly twenty-one hours.
(15) The transfer of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) to
the Department of Homeland Security in 2003 had undermined NDMS effec-
tiveness. When Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, NDMS was unpre-
pared to properly respond,34 also there was confusion between HHS and
DHS about deploying NDMS personnel and assets.
B. Public Health Aspects of Multi-Disciplinary Coordination and
Communications
Disasters require non-traditional partnerships, and the partners must be
notified and must participate in coordination of the event. These include: 1)
local law enforcement and potentially the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI); 2) public health-populations of patients rather than simply individu-
als are involved; 3) the EMS agency; 4) city/county/state or tribal/federal
administration; 5) the Laboratory Response Network; 6) the media; 7) mor-
tuary affairs; and 8) faith-based leaders. Clear procedures must be in place
to maintain the "chain of evidence" and proper authorities must be notified,
such as public health and the FBI, when collecting samples. A 24/7 report-
ing system must be implemented so notifications can be readily made at all
hours during the emergency. Potential damage to physical communications
infrastructure necessitates appropriate redundancy planning and must con-
34. U.S. HOUSE OF REP. COMM. ON Gov'T REFORM, THE DECLINE OF THE NATIONAL
DISASTER MEDICAL SYSTEM 1-2 (2005),
http://oversight.house.gov/Documents/20051209095733-01279.pdf.
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sider alternate forms of communications and notification systems. In past
disasters, communications networks have been crippled significantly by mas-
sive simultaneous utilization by the affected population. The numbers of
persons attempting to access various telecommunication systems simultane-
ously affects the communication networks in such a way that no calls can get
through, even though the system remains physically intact.
C. Surge Capacity and Alternate Sites of Care
A strategy to improve system capacity-surge capacity-is critical to
optimize preparation and management of mass casualties. Even with an op-
timal IMS, if the health care system lacks the capacity to provide patient care
to large numbers of casualties, people will die. Our current health care sys-
tem has virtually no excess capacity. This is very cost-efficient under ordi-
nary circumstances, but problematic following any type of disaster or public
health emergency that produces large numbers of casualties. Even a small
increase in the number of patients stresses the current health care system.
Compounding the problem is the issue that hospital disaster plans cannot
count on a staff level that equals or exceeds their normal staffing. Some staff
members will go home-or not come in-so they can take care of their own
families, while others may be isolated because of road conditions or other
physical problems. Additionally, loss of power, phones, and cellphones can
make it difficult or impossible to respond. Hospitals need plans that are ca-
pable of functioning at scaled levels, based on the scope of the emergency
and the availability of the staff. An expert has proposed a model for improv-
ing surge capacity for hospitals that contains of three components: "Staff,"
"Stuff," and "Structure," with "Structure" consisting of both the management
infrastructure as well as the physical buildings required to provide patient
care. 3  Using this model; personnel, supplies, equipment, physical space,
and a management infrastructure, consistent with the needs of the event,
would be identified and provided.
Traditionally, hospitals have been thought of as the major or the only
places for medical care; but, hospital resources can easily be exceeded or the
hospital could become non-functional because of flooding, power-issues, or
35. Donna Barbisch, Regional Responses to Terrorism and Other Medical Disasters:
Developing Sustainable Surge Capacity, in COMMUNITY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE TO
TERRORISM: THE TERRORIST THREAT AND COMMUNITY RESPONSE 78-80 (James A. Johnson et
al. eds., 2005); Donna Barbisch, Surge Capacity: Seamless Emergency Medical Logistics
Expansion System: From Concept to Operational Capability 22, 25-27, 30-31 (Apr. 20,
2004) (presented at the 2004 Nat'l Disaster Med. Sys. Conf.), available at
http://www.ndms.chepinc.org/presentations/2004/142.pdf.
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contamination. One strategy for dealing with mass casualties is to use alter-
nate sites of care, referred to as "surge hospitals," such as veterinary hospi-
tals, shuttered retail stores, athletic arenas, airport hangers, and other facili-
ties. 36 Another strategy is to "surge" within existing hospitals by, for exam-
ple, adding additional beds, opening unused wards, and adding personnel.
The capability to emergently expand patient care capacity is required by the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)
standards. Thus, all hospital facilities must either designate appropriate al-
ternate sites of care or have an internal surge capacity. 37 The Medical Disas-
ter Response concept is one example of such an approach.3 8 The local ad-
ministrative jurisdiction (EMS or public health) should also be involved in
community and regional planning for alternate care sites.
Expanded hospitals and surge hospitals require additional staff. The re-
cruitment of properly licensed and credentialed health care volunteers pre-
sents significant challenges for public and private health entities. The exist-
ing methods for the deployment of voluntary health personnel in emergen-
cies are limited by issues with recruitment of qualified volunteers, effective
use of volunteers during emergencies, and verification of the identity and
qualifications of the volunteers by those seeking their assistance. 39 To ade-
quately staff this expanded capacity, decision-makers should consider inno-
vative concepts to provide emergency credentialing of personnel. One tech-
nique is to temporarily grant privileges to providers by honoring the creden-
tialing process of neighboring institutions. Another technique is to employ
the concept of a National Medical License for Disasters (NMLD). There
would be strict criteria for obtaining and maintaining the license, including
passing the United States Medical Licensing Exam (USMLE) and yearly
Continuing Medical Education (CME) credits, as well as yearly assessment
of the individual's role and responsibility in an incident. Such a license
would not be active until a disaster or catastrophe is declared. When it is the
36. JOINT COMM. ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., SURGE HOSPITALS:
PROVIDING SAFE CARE IN EMERGENCIES iv, 2 (2006), http://www.jointcommission.org/
NR/rdonlyres/802E9DA4-AE80-4584-A205-48989C5BD684/0/surgehospital.pdf [hereinaf-
ter SURGE HOSPITALS].
37. See JOINT COMM. ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., STANDING TOGETHER:
AN EMERGENCY PLANNING GUIDE FOR AMERICA'S COMMUNITIES 35 (2005),
http://www.jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres/FE29E7D3-22AA-4DEB-94B2-
5E8D507F92D1/0/planningguide.pdf; SURGE HOSPITALS, supra note 36, at 10.
38. See Carl H. Schultz et al., A Medical Disaster Response to Reduce Immediate Mortal-
ity After an Earthquake, 334 NEw ENG. J. MED. 438,439-40,443 (1996).
39. James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., The Legal Framework for Meeting Surge Capacity
Through the Use of Volunteer Health Professionals During Public Health Emergencies and
Other Disasters, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 5, 21-22 (2005).
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activated practitioner, it is automatically "federalized" and thus, the practi-
tioner is insured as a federal practitioner. It replaces a registration system
and is more cost effective for the federal government and for the regions in
need of health care providers. It could allow for qualified foreign personnel
to assist in a domestic emergency if the foreign physicians can pass our tests
and maintain their national medical license for disaster.
D. Health Risk Communications During Disasters
Health care providers and the public may lack a basic understanding of
the true risks associated with certain types of disasters. This lack of knowl-
edge can reduce the effectiveness of mitigation measures which would oth-
erwise limit morbidity and mortality.
Clear and concise messages-ideally prepared in advance of an event-
delivered by a credible technical spokesperson can positively influence out-
comes. One of the challenges is that the scientific knowledge necessary to
support appropriate prevention and treatment recommendations may initially
be absent.
Public information is readily available at several locations, particularly
government websites such as:
http://www.ready.gov
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/
http://www.fema.gov/hazard/index.shtm
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/intro.shtml
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2002-139/default.html#toc
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/learning/preparedness.php
These sites may be invaluable for the continued dissemination of information
before and after a natural disaster or a deliberate attack. Additionally, by
providing information about when and where to seek treatment, how to rec-
ognize symptoms of particular diseases, techniques for sheltering, and meth-
ods of mitigation, we can potentially decrease the "surge" burden to emer-
gency response systems.
E. Delicate Legal Issues Regarding Public Health During Catastrophes
Certain laws and regulations can be problematic in the face of mass
casualties. For example, in situations where there is exposure to a conta-
gious agent, quarantine of exposed individuals and isolation of ill persons
may be necessary. Quarantine authority varies by jurisdiction and has not
been invoked for many years in the United States. It may become necessary
to involuntarily isolate exposed victims until lack of contagion can be as-
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sured. This will likely require close collaboration between hospital security,
local law enforcement, and public health authorities. Thus, "[t]he balance
between civil liberties and the protection of public health remains a chal-
lenge."4°
Complications can arise with application of the Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act/Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act (COBRA/EMTALA), 41 which limits transfer of patients to specific pre-
defined circumstances and requires facilities with the capability and capacity
for a higher level of care to accept patients in transfer, and the Health Insur-
ance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)42 privacy regulations.
There is an emergency exception in the HIPAA regulations, 43 but case law is
lacking to determine whether this would be sufficient to allow appropriate
medical information to be transmitted in a mass casualty situation.
F. Triage
In the setting of mass casualties, the goal of triage shifts from doing the
best for an individual to "doing the most good for the most patients." There
are several systems available to manage a large influx of casualties. The
most common system used in the United States for initial triage is START
(Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment). 44 Of note, patients who are contami-
nated or those who are exposed to contagious agents must be triaged in a
manner that minimizes the possibility of transmitting the hazardous agent to
others.45
G. Securing Healthcare Facilities
During catastrophes a security plan must be in place that limits access to
the hospital or appropriate ward(s) so only patients, authorized personnel
40. Kristi L. Koenig, Christopher A. Kahn & Carl H. Schultz, Medical Strategies to
Handle Mass Casualties from the Use of Biological Weapons, U.C. POSTPRINTS 16 (2006),
http://repositories.cdlib.org/postprints/2100/ (click on "Download the Article") (last visited
June 21, 2007).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000 & Supp.); see also Special Responsibilities of Medicare
Hospitals in Emergency Cases, 42 CFR § 489.24 (2003).
42. Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); see also HIPAA,
http://www.hipaa.org/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
43. See id.
44. See generally Los ANGELES FIRE DEP'T, SIMPLE TRIAGE AND RAPID TREATMENT
(START) (Aug. 12, 2005), http://www.cert-la.com/triage/start.pdf.
45. David C. Cone & Kristi L. Koenig, Mass Casualty Triage in the Chemical, Biologi-
cal, Radiological, or Nuclear Environment, 12 EUR. J. EMERG. MED. 287, 287 (2005).
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and, if appropriate, patient visitors may enter. Logistical interventions, such
as shutting down the ventilation systems, may be needed to prevent rapid
spread if there is a contagious agent involved. "Reducing a building's vul-
nerability to an airborne chemical, biological, or radiological attack requires
a comprehensive [plan]. Decisions concerning which protective measures to
implement should be based on the threat profile and a security assessment of
the building and its occupants. [P]hysical security is the first layer of de-
fense."46 A building security assessment should be done to determine the
necessity of additional measures. Codes must be developed such that new
building systems adopt design features that are capable of incorporating the
currently rapidly evolving technology which offers a greater level of protec-
tion.
H. Personal Protective Equipment for Health Care Providers
Standard precautions should be used for all patient encounters. In addi-
tion, if patients are exposed to agents that are spread person-to-person, ap-
propriate respiratory personal protective equipment (PPE) may be needed to
decrease the risk from exposure to respiratory droplets. There is some con-
troversy regarding what types of masks would be protective if an agent is
unknown. For agents transmitted by respiratory droplets, an N-95 mask
would theoretically be adequate. In other situations, a HEPA filter mask
might be more appropriate. This issue is currently unresolved.
I. Stockpiling
Strategic planning for mass casualties requires appropriate stockpiling
of necessary medications, supplies, and equipment; especially since most
hospitals have a "just-in-time" strategy for providing pharmaceuticals and
equipment to their patients on a daily basis and lack the ability to rapidly
expand resources to meet the needs of a large influx of casualties. Threat
vulnerability analysis helps determine what should be in the stockpile by
providing data regarding events that pose the greatest threat for a given
place. Portable disposable ventilators and training staff in their use are ad-
vised. In addition, another sad lesson learned from Katrina is the need for
additional persons, such as family members, to receive training on an ad-hoc
basis on bag-valve-mask techniques to keep their relatives alive. If an event
unfolds quickly, such as an earthquake, storage of stockpiles must be close
by. Medications that arrive after six to twelve hours may have little impact.
46. CDC, NIOSH, GUIDANCE FOR PROTECTING BUILDING ENvIRoNMENTs FROM
AIRBORNE, CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, OR RADIOLOGICAL ATACKS 22 (May 2002).
[Vol. 31
18
Nova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 4
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol31/iss3/4
HURRICANE KA TRINA: A DEADLY WARNING
If, however, it takes several days for a disaster to fully develop, then there
may be time to request additional medications and other equipment from a
remote location. In general, a combination of local, regional, statewide, and
federal caches is ideal. Careful administration will prevent multiple entities
from being dependent on the same supplier. In between disasters, medica-
tions and other perishable items from the stockpile should be rotated into
local or regional usage to minimize losses from expiration. One problem that
arose during the medical management of victims of Katrina was the jurisdic-
tion of the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Supplies from the SNS be-
long to the Federal Government until they are dispatched for use at which
time ownership is transferred to the state. In at least one site, the SNS was
delivered but not used, because all of the medical staff present at the scene
were from a federal group and they were not permitted to use the supplies
that were very much needed by the victims of the hurricane because of juris-
dictional issues.47 This issue is still unresolved.
J. Psychological Aspects of Public Health Aspects of Catastrophes
A key component of any response is the psychological care for victims,
involved emergency personnel, affected communities, and the country at
large. Close integration with health risk communicators may help to mitigate
some of the psychological trauma that is likely to follow an attack. 48 Con-
trary to popular mythology, very few people, if any, panic during disasters.49
Nonetheless fear will cause an increase in persons presenting for care and the
incremental effects of increased call volume, hazardous materials team re-
sponses, and concerned patients with unexplained medical symptoms visiting
the emergency departments which can prove to be highly detrimental to pub-
lic health and emergency response services.5°
47. E-mail from Raymond E. Swienton M.D., FACEP, Associate Professor of Emer-
gency Medicine, Co-Director EMS, Disaster Medicine & Homeland Security Section, Divi-
sion of Emergency Medicine, Southwestern Medical Center to author (May 22, 2006 11:00:10
PST) (on file with author).
48. See Simon Wessely et al., Psychological Implications of Chemical and Biological
Weapons, BRITISH MED. J. (INT. ED.), Oct. 20, 2001, at 878, available at
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/323/7318/878?ck=nck.
49. Bill Durodi6 & Simon Wessely, Resilience or Panic? The Public and Terrorist At-
tack, THE LANCET, Dec. 14, 2002, at 1901, available at http://www.sciencedirect.com (search
Title "Resilience or Panic? The Public and Terrorist Attack").
50. See G. James Rubin et al., Psychological and Behavioural Reactions to the Bombings
in London on 7 July 2005: Cross Sectional Survey of a Representative Sample of Londoners,
BRITISH MED. J. (INT. ED.), Aug. 26, 2005, at 1, available at
http://bmj.com/cgi/content/fill/7517/606#BIBL.
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K. Health Care Providers Impacted by the Catastrophe
A particular aspect of physical and psychological trauma is the impact
of a catastrophe on the people participating in response and recovery activi-
ties. Whether particular response persons are injured or concerned about the
effects on themselves and their families, the net effect is the same: loss of
personnel. This decrease in personnel can affect the efficiency and success
of the overall response effort-as was evident in the response to Hurricane
Katrina.51 Providing information and solutions to people prior to and during
the event helps-as does providing any needed personal protective equip-
ment and post exposure medications or vaccines. Helping staff take care of
their families and dependents is an essential effort to help secure the services
of those persons who may otherwise need to care for their families. Stress
debriefing and other psychological care services may help, but the efficacy
of certain techniques is unclear and may actually be detrimental.
L. Mortuary Affairs
Planning at local and regional levels must take into consideration safe
locations for the storage of possibly contagious or contaminated remains.
Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams (DMORT), 52 should be con-
tacted, but local officials should prepare in case the DMORT is not immedi-
ately available to assist. The needs of criminal investigations and public
health concerns, as well as the availability of mortuary services during a
surge of mortality, may conflict with families' wishes for rapid disposition of
remains and religious concerns regarding timing and method of disposition.
Confusion arose during Hurricane Katrina because the flood damaged some
local cemeteries and uprooted trees which exposed some human remains.
53
Inclusion of local religious leaders into ongoing planning/exercise events
involving mortuary affairs may help mitigate some concerns. Religion-
neutral, compassionately devised health risk communications may help alle-
viate public concern. Such measures will enhance the ability of law en-
forcement and public health agencies to carry out their duties while maintain-
ing appropriate respect and dignity for the deceased.
51. See A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 17.
52. Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team, DMORT Mass Fatality Assistance,
http://www.dmort.org/ (last visited June 21, 2007).
53. National Park Service - Task Force Responds to Hurricane Katrina: Hurricanes 2005
- National Park Service Status Report (Dec. 30, 2005), http://www.heritagepreservation.org/
PROGRAMS/KatrinaNPS.HTM.
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M. Special Populations
Specific populations are likely to be at higher risk of morbidity and
mortality during disasters. These include geriatric, pediatric, immunocom-
promised, and pregnant persons, as well as those with limited communica-
tions abilities due to physical (deafness, blindness), cognitive (mental ill-
ness), or language barriers. As revealed in the response to Hurricane
Katrina, persons who are homebound or who are reliant on home health nurs-
ing and materials, are also at higher risk, as are persons who are in high-
density populations, such as shelters, nursing homes, and prisons. Education
and surveillance in these populations is critical as are plans for early trans-
portation or sheltering in place, quarantine/isolation, and treatment as
needed.
VI. PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICAL SUPPORT CHANGES STIMULATED BY
THE 2005 HURRICANES AND SUBSEQUENT THREAT ASSESSMENTS
On December 19, 2006, the President signed into law the Pandemic and
All-Hazards Preparedness Act. 14 This law has:
(1) Transferred the National Disaster Medical System back from DHS
to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS);
(2) Created the office of Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Re-
sponse within the HHS to consolidate the responsibilities for federal public
health and medical emergency preparedness and response activities;
(3) Required the Secretary of HHS to appoint an official to ensure that
the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) addresses the needs of at-risk popula-
tions, oversee development of curriculum for training programs on medical
management of at-risk individuals, and disseminate best practices for out-
reach to and care for at-risk individuals before, during, and following public
health emergencies;
(4) Beginning in 2009, HHS is required to prepare and submit the Na-
tional Health Security Strategy for coordinated public health preparedness
and response to Congress every four years. The strategy will evaluate and
measure progress in federal, state, local, and tribal preparedness.
(5) Provided for cooperative agreements (i.e., grants) to state and se-
lected local public health entities to improve health security, however, states
or a consortium of states must agree to supplement this with non-federal
funds. It also authorized grants to universities, laboratories, and hospitals for
54. Pub. L. No. 109-417, 120 Stat. 2831 (2004) (codified at various sections of 42
U.S.C.).
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tuition loans for persons willing to serve two years in local, state, or tribal
health departments.
(6) Required the development of a nationwide, near real-time elec-
tronic public health situational awareness capability.
(7) Strengthened federal support and structure for the Medical Reserve
Corps (MRC) program.
(8) Established the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development
Authority (BARDA) and a Biodefense Medical Countermeasure Develop-
ment Fund to allow BARDA to fund the development of products between
NIH-funded basic research and end-stage procurement by the BioShield pro-
gram.
(9) Established the National Biodefense Science Board.
(10) Set up limited anti-trust exemptions to help pharmaceutical com-
panies collaborate with each other and with the government in the develop-
ment of medical countermeasures and made other reforms to the Project
BioShield Act of 200455 to facilitate drug development.
Unresolved issues include:
(1) Issues with medical licensing and malpractice risk for volun-
teer health workers from out of the affected region.
(2) Better coordination of logistics and transparencies to coordi-
nate logistic actives between private and public entities.
(3) Improving interoperable communication systems, detection
systems, and warning systems.
(4) Improving education, exercising, and training for private citi-
zens.
(5) Preparing healthcare facilities and response agencies to triage
for a large numbers of patients and assuring that they have ready access
to current diagnostic and treatment information, while protecting the re-
sponding personnel from further harm is critical and complicated. This
problem is compounded because 90% of the United States health care
system is in private hands and these private entities struggle with the is-
sue of unfunded mandates.
VII. CONCLUSION
The management of disasters requires a carefully orchestrated multi-
disciplinary plan for federal, state, tribal, local, and private entities and re-
quires an interdisciplinary understanding of the threats and issues. Thus, a
55. Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
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crucial necessity for preparation, mitigation, response to, and recovery from
catastrophic events is the existence of pre-existing relationships between
medical, public health, policy, and law enforcement agencies at all levels of
government coupled with a coordinated national response plan operating
under a national incident management system. Public and private entities at
all levels have to drill, drill, and re-drill, while learning from those drills and
improve plans, and drilling them again so that we don't wait for another ca-
tastrophe to reveal weakness. Careful attention to education and training
efforts and to health risk communications planning can help mitigate physi-
cal and psychological casualties, minimize attrition among response person-
nel, and decrease damage to infrastructure. The Federal Government in co-
ordination with local, state, and private entities has made many efforts to
improve our response since the hurricanes of 2005 and has set in motion a
mechanism for continuous revision and improvement. We must be ever vigi-
lant, however, to ensure that this momentum is not halted or derailed and that
the ideas are tested and retested so that we will never again face the catastro-
phic human, economic, and social toll extracted by disasters with the magni-
tude of the hurricanes of 2005.
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Table 1: Evolution of Federal and National Response to Disasters and
Catastrophes
56
1803: Congressional Act of 1803: Provided assistance by waiving duties &
tariffs for merchants following fires in Portsmouth, New Hampshire.
1900: Congress chartered American Red Cross as a charitable organization to
provide disaster relief This charter was dissolved for financial difficulties and a
new charter was created in 1905.
1932: Hoover's Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC): Lent money to
banks and institutions to stimulate economic activity & dispense federal dollars
after a disaster.
1934: Bureau of Public Roads given authority to finance reconstruction of
highways and roads after a disaster.
1944: Flood Control Act: Gave U.S. Army Corps of Engineers authority over
flood control and irrigation projects.
1950: Civil Defense Act: First comprehensive legislation on federal disaster
relief.
1952: President Truman's Executive Order 10427: Established federal disaster
assistance is a supplement.
1965: Establish HUD: Led to the establishment of the Federal Disaster Assis-
tance Administration.
1968: National Flood Insurance Act.
1973: President Nixon's Report: New approach to Federal Disaster, assistance
is a supplement.
56. See FEMA, FEMA History, http://www.fema.gov/about/history.shtm (last visited
June 21, 2007); THOMAS E. DRABEK, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT: STRATEGIES FOR
MAINTAINING ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRITY (Springer-Verlag 1990); The National Archives,
Records of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), available at
http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/311.html (last visited June 21,
2007); TOWNSEND, supra note 17, at 11-19; National Emergency Management Association
(NEMA): Emergency Management, http://em.nemaweb.org/?17 (last visited June 21, 2007);
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT (Thomas E.
Drabek & Gerard J. Hoetmer eds., Municipal Mgmt. 1991); The National Archives, Records
of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), available at
http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/234.html (last visited June 21,
2007); Civil Defense and Emergency Management Organizational History: United States
1917-2001 (2003), http://www.richmond.edu/-wgreen/Ecdflow.pdf; KEVIN R. KOSAR, THE
CONGRESSIONAL CHARTER OF THE AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS: OVERVIEW, HISTORY,
AND ANALYSIS (Mar. 15, 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33314.pdf;
All-Hazard Authorities of the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/flm/frm-acts.pdf; The American Presidency Project, Jimmy Carter:
Executive Order 12148-Federal Emergency Management, July 20, 1979, available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=32625.
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1974: Disaster Relief Act: Established process of presidential disaster declara-
tions.
1979: President Carter's Executive Order 12148: Created FEMA to coordinate
all disaster relief efforts at the federal level. FEMA absorbed HUD's: Federal
Insurance Administration, National Fire Prevention and Control Administration,
National Weather Service Community Preparedness Program, Federal Prepared-
ness Agency of the General Services Administration, Federal Disaster Assistance
Administration.
Also, FEMA charged to oversee the nation's Civil Defense (previously done by
DoD's Defense Civil Preparedness Agency).
1988: Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.
1993: President Clinton elevated FEMA to a cabinet level position.
2000: Disaster Mitigation Act (Stafford Act with revisions). 57
2002: Homeland Security Act: Incorporated FEMA into DHS (stood up March
2003). 58
2005: Hurricane Katrina and Rita.
2006: Notice of Change to the National Response Plan: Reorganized incident
management, created the Domestic Readiness Group, established the National
Operations center, changed and broadened the scope of the Catastrophic Incident
annex, and clarified the meaning of an "Incident of National Significance". 9
2006: Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006.60:
2007: Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007: Reorganiz-
ing DHS and the role of FEMA within DHS.
Table 2: Major U.S. Disasters (Deaths >1000)62
Year Event Deaths
1865 Steamship explosion 1547
1875 Forest fire (Wisconsin) 1182
57. Pub. L. No. 106-390 (2000).
58. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/bill/hsl-bill.pdf; see also The White House,
Analysis for the Homeland Security Act of 2002,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/analysis/hsl-bill-analysis.pdf (last visited June
21, 2007).
59. NOTICE OF CHANGE TO NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN, supra note 15, at 9; NIMS Key
Revision Issues - Background, supra note 15.
60. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-90,
119 Stat. 2064.
61. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295,
120 Stat. 1355.
62. Table modified from Craig Goolsby et al., Disaster Planning, EMEDICINE.COM (May
25, 2006), at tbl. 1, http://www.emedicine.com/EMERG/topic718.htm (last visited June 21,
2007).
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1889 Flood (Pennsylvania) >2000
1900 Hurricane (Texas) 8000
1904 Steamship fire 1021
1906 San Francisco earthquake >3000
1928 Hurricane (Florida) 2000
1941 Pearl Harbor attack 2403
2001 September 11 attack 2819
2005 Hurricane (Gulf Coast) 1527
Figure 1: Organization of the NRP
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Table 3: Emergency Support Functions in the NRP63
# Function Primary Department or
I Agency
ESF 1 Transportation DOT
ESF 2 Communication DHS (IAIP/NCS)
ESF 3 Public Works & Engineering DoD (USACE), DHS
(FEMA)
ESF 4 Firefighting USDA (Forest Service)
ESF 5 Emergency Management DHS (FEMA)
ESF 6 Mass Care, Housing, Human Services DHS (FEMA), American
Red Cross
ESF 7 Resources Support GSA
ESF 8 Public Health & Medical Support HHS
ESF 9 Urban Search & Rescue DHS (FEMA)
ESF 10 Oil & Hazardous Material Response EPA, DHS (Coast Guard)
ESF 11 Agriculture & Natural Resources USDA, DOI
ESF 12 Energy DOE
ESF 13 Public Safety & Security DOJ
ESF 14 Long Term Community Recovery & USDA, DOC, DHS, HUD,
Mitigation Treasury, SBA
ESF 15 External Affairs DHS (FEMA)
63. This table is a modified version of the December 2004 NRP modified to include the
revisions specified in the Notice of Change to the National Response Plan dated May 25, 2006
version 5.0.
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Figure 2: Post-Hurricane Katrina Integration of ICS with ESF's
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Table 4: Hurricane Katrina Key Events and Response 64
Time 65  Event Federal State & Local
Thursday, August 25, 2005
12:00 p.m. FEMA conducts first video
teleconference to help syn-
chronize federal, state, and
local responders and,
as a means of defining and
coordinating assistance and
support needs, these calls were
held each day at noon from
August 25 until well after land-
fall.
3:30 p.m.* Tropical FEMA delivers 100 truckloads
Storm of ice, 35 truckloads of food,
Katrina be- and 70 trucks of water to stag-
comes Hurri- ing areas in Georgia, and over
cane Katrina 400 truckloads of ice, over 500
(Category 1) truckloads of water, and nearly
200 truckloads of food at logis-
tics centers in Alabama, Lou-
isiana, Georgia, Texas, and
South Carolina.
6:30 p.m. Hurricane FEMA places Rapid Needs
Katrina Assessment and Emergency
slams into Response Teams - Advance
South Florida Elements (ERT-As) on alert.
at the Dade-
Broward
County line.
64. See generally supra note 17 and accompanying text.
65. To emphasize the view from Washington, D.C., the time used here is Eastern Stan-
dard Time (Louisiana is on Central Time). The time also reflects the view of the Homeland
Security Operations Center.
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Friday, August 26, 2005
1:00 a.m. Eye passes
over Miami,
Florida.
5:00 a.m. Katrina clears
from South
Florida.
11:30 a.m. Katrina be-
A comes a
Category 2
hurricane and
is predicted
to make sec-
ond landfall
near Florida
Panhandle as
Category 3.
1:00 p.m.* Louisiana Gover-
nor Kathleen
Blanco declares a
State of Emer-
gency and acti-
vates the National
Guard.
4:30 p.m. Mississippi Gov-
ernor Haley
Barbour declares
a State of Emer-
gency and acti-
vates the National
Guard.
5:00 p.m. National Hurricane Center
(NHC)changes prediction of
second landfall from the Flor-
ida Panhandle to eastern Lou-
isiana and Mississippi.
Saturday, August 27, 2005
5:00 a.m. NHC issues forecast stating
that Katrina is a Category 3
hurricane and predicts a direct
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hit on New Orleans, Louisiana.
7:00 a.m. FEMA NRCC activated at
Level 1 (24 hour operation);
FEMA NRCC ESFs 2, 6, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and
EMC activated.
8:30 a.m. National Weather Service Louisiana and
(NWS) informs Louisiana state Mississippi Emer-
and local officials that "prob- gency Operations
able path is right smack Center activated,
through metropolitan New Governors of
Orleans." Louisiana and
Mississippi de-
clare State of
Emergency.
10:00 a.m. FEMA ERT-As activated, pre-
staged at FEMA RRCC Region
IV in Atlanta, Georgia and
deployed to Alabama and
Mississippi.
12:00 p.m. FEMA Region IV at Level 1; Governor Blanco
all ESFs + Military Liaison requests declara-
Activated, Coast Guard Acti- tion of Federal
vated. State of Emer-
gency under Staf-
ford Act.
2:00 p.m. Press Conference:
New Orleans
Mayor Ray Nagin
and Governor
Blanco announce
issuance of Vol-
untary Evacuation
Order & Super-
dome will open at
8 a.m CDT on
Sunday as "Spe-
cial Needs Shel-
ter".
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5:00 p.m. Contra Flow acti-
vated on Missis-
sippi and Louisi-
ana Interstate
Highway.
7:44 - Emergency Declaration
8:00 p.m. FEMA-3212-#M-LA for Lou-
isiana; FCO- Lokey; NWS
advises New Orleans levees
could be overtopped.
Sunday, August 28, 2005
9:00 a.m. Superdome opens
as a Special Needs
Shelter (8:00 a.m.
CDT).
10:30 a.m. Mayor Nagin
orders a manda-
tory evacuation of
Orleans Parish.
11:00 - Emergency Declaration Governor of Ala-
11:15 a.m. FEMA-3212-#M-LA for Mis- bama declares
sissippi; FCO- William Lokey. State of Emer-
gency; Superdome
opened as "refuge
of last resort" for
general popula-
tion.
5:00 p.m. FEMA has pre-positioned ice, Contra Flow deac-
trailers, and MRE's in 16 re- tivated on Missis-
gional centers. sippi and Louisi-
ana Interstate
Highway.
6:30 p.m. Emergency Declaration
FEMA-3212-#M-LA for Ala-
bama; FCO- Ron Sharman.
Monday, August 29, 2005
7:10 a.m. Katrina
makes land-
fall in south-
eastern Lou-
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isiana as a
strong Cate-
gory 3 hurri-
cane.
9:21 a.m. First report of
Levee breaches;
Superdome begins
to leak.
10:50 a.m. HSOC reports "possible" levee
"issue".
2:00 p.m. Communica- Search and rescue efforts by Search and rescue
tions used by U.S. Coast Guard begin, efforts by New
first respond- Orleans Police
ers fail. and Fire Depart-
ments, Louisiana
National Guard,
and Louisiana
Department of
Wildlife and Fish-
eries.
9:00 p.m. FEMA Director Brown prom-
ises Governor Blanco 500
buses.
11:30 p.m. FEMA search and rescue teams
arrive and begin operations.
Tuesday, August 30, 2005
6:00 a.m. HSOC issues report of levee
breaches at Industrial Canal,
17th street, and Lake Poncha-
train.
11:30 a.m. Acting Deputy Secretary of Mayor Nagin
Defense orders NORTHCOM opens New Or-
to move all needed assets to leans Convention
Gulf Coast, gives blanket au- Center as refuge
thority for military assistance. for general popu-
lation.
7:30 p.m. Secretary Chertoff declares Governor Blanco
Katrina an "Incident of Na- directs Depart-
tional Significance" and desig- ment of Social
nates Mike Brown as PFO. Services to find a
shelter by 6 a.m.
Wednesday for at
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least 25,000 peo-
ple.
Wednesday, August 31, 2005
12:30 a.m. Midnight order by FEMA as-
signs DOT to send buses to
New Orleans.
Morning Secretary Mike Leavitt (HHS) Governor Blanco
declares a public health emer- issues an Execu-
gency for Louisiana, Missis- tive Order (No.
sippi, Alabama, and Florida. KBB 2005-31) to
commandeer
school buses;
Calls Governor
Perry of Texas to
request use of
Astrodome to
house New Or-
leans evacuees.
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